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 Principled Remedial Discretion 
Under the Charter 
Kent Roach* 
The Supreme Court of Canada decided a number of cases in 2003 
that confirmed the importance of remedial discretion under the Charter. 
The most well-known and controversial was Doucet-Boudreau v. Nova 
Scotia (Minister of Education).1 In that case, the Court upheld the dis-
cretion of a trial judge under section 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms2 to order that the government make best efforts to 
provide French language schools by certain times in various parts of 
Nova Scotia, and require the government to report back to the trial judge 
on its compliance with the order. The Court, however, was closely and 
firmly divided with four judges arguing in dissent that the trial judge 
had abused his discretion by violating the separation of powers; by act-
ing after his jurisdiction had been exhausted; and by issuing a vague 
remedial order. Doucet-Boudreau may encourage trial judges to exercise 
supervisory jurisdiction in Charter cases and to order Charter remedies 
that are more specific than the general declarations that have generally 
been used in the past. But much will depend on how trial judges exer-
cise this discretion in the future. 
Doucet-Boudreau was not the only victory for the remedial discre-
tion of trial judges. In British Columbia (Minister of Forests) v. 
Okanagan Indian Band,3 the Supreme Court also made clear that trial 
judges have a discretion to order interim or advance costs in public 
interest litigation with a minority raising concerns that the Court had 
provided no real guidance as to how trial judges should exercise this 
expanded discretion. In addition, the Supreme Court was not above 
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1  [2003] 3 S.C.R. 3, [2003] S.C.J. No. 63. 
2  Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 
(U.K.), 1982, c. 11. 
3  [2003] 3 S.C.R. 371, [2003] S.C.J. No. 76. 
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exercising some remedial discretion of its own in 2003. It suspended 
declarations of invalidity in three cases4 but in only two of those cases 
did the Court attempt to apply the restrictive rules in Schachter5 for 
suspending a declaration of invalidity. In a fourth case, R. v. Powley, it 
determined that there were no compelling reasons to extend a stay or 
period of suspension.6 
The remedial cases decided by the Court this year provide a good 
vehicle for discussing the importance of remedial discretion under the 
Charter and the variety of approaches that can be taken to conceptualiz-
ing and governing the exercise of remedial discretion. In the first part of 
this paper, I will address the issue of remedial discretion at a general and 
conceptual level. I will argue that the remedial discretion of trial judges 
is a fundamental feature of the Charter and one that distinguishes it from 
the Canadian Bill of Rights.7 The Charter embraces the common sense 
notion that rights will not be meaningful without remedies, but it also 
contemplates that remedial decision-making will be heavily dependent 
on context and the trial judge’s exercise of discretion. I will then outline 
three different types of discretion that can be exercised by trial judges. 
The first is strong discretion, in the sense that it is or appears not to be 
governed either by rules or principles, especially those that are articu-
lated and applied by appellate courts. A second kind of discretion is in 
part a reaction to the unconstrained freedom of pure discretion. It is a 
regime of ruled-based discretion in which the remedial discretion of trial 
judges is cabined by rules or pigeon holes enumerated by the appellate 
courts. A third form of discretion is principled remedial discretion 
which is not under-governed by law in the way of pure discretion or 
over-governed by self-executing categories and rules. Principled reme-
dial discretion involves a judge applying general principles, such as the 
need for effective remedies and respect for institutional role, to the con-
text of a particular violation. 
                                                                                                                                
4  Trociuk v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [2003] 1 S.C.R. 835, [2003] S.C.J. 
No. 32; Nova Scotia (Workers’ Compensation Board) v. Martin, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 504, [2003] 
S.C.J. No. 54; Figueroa v. Canada (Attorney General), [2003] 1 S.C.R. 912, [2003] S.C.J. 
No. 37. 
5  Schachter v. Canada, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 679, [1992] S.C.J. No. 68. 
6  R. v. Powley, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 207, [2003] S.C.J. No. 43. 
7  S.C. 1960, c. 44, reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. III. 
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The three categories that I outline are evaluative, dynamic, and con-
troversial. What one person sees as a principled test for the exercise of 
discretion can appear to another person to be overly constrained by rules 
and examples. For example, the three-part Stillman8 test for the exclu-
sion of evidence is criticized by many as being based on inflexible and 
unsound rules that fetter the trial judge’s ability to balance the compet-
ing interests. At the same time, it can be defended as offering special 
protections for the accused’s broad right against self-incrimination while 
allowing the trial judge to balance the seriousness of the violation 
against the adverse effects of excluding evidence in cases that do not 
threaten the fairness of trials. Similarly, there are disputes about the rule 
in Rahey9 requiring a stay of proceedings as the minimal remedy for a 
violation of the right to a trial in a reasonable time under section  11(b) 
of the Charter. For some, it is an inflexible rule that can lead to unex-
pected consequences such as the Askov crisis, while to others it is a 
principled and purposive approach that recognizes the unfairness to the 
accused of requiring a trial after an unreasonable period of delay. In 
Schachter v. Canada,10 Lamer C.J.C. for a majority of the Court stressed 
that section 1 analysis could provide helpful principles for deciding 
whether to extend underinclusive legislation by reading in, while La 
Forest J. expressed a concern that it could “encourage a mechanistic 
approach to the process, rather than encourage examination of more 
fundamental issues.” A principled approach to remedial discretion 
forces judges to justify their remedial choices, but it can result in dis-
agreements, as seen in the dissents in both Stillman and Rahey. 
Recognizing the contingency of the categories, and especially the 
sometimes elusive distinction between inflexible rules and sound 
                                                                                                                                
8  R. v. Stillman, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 607, [1997] S.C.J. No. 34. Note that in R. v. Buhay, 
[2003] 1 S.C.R. 631, [2003] S.C.J. No. 30, the Court deferred to a trial judge’s exercise of 
discretion to exclude unconstitutionally obtained evidence in order to avoid condoning a 
serious Charter violation. 
9  R. v. Rahey, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 588; [1987] S.C.J. No. 23. In R. v. Taillefer (sub nom. 
R. v. Duguay), [2003] 3 S.C.R. 307, at para. 121, [2003] S.C.J. No. 75, the Court indicated 
that a new trial would be the minimal remedy when the accused’s right to full answer and 
defence had been violated by a disclosure violation. The Court indicated that a stay would be 
appropriate only in cases where a new trial would perpetuate “an injustice and would tarnish 
the integrity of our judicial system” by violating the “community’s sense of fair play and 
decency.” Id., at para. 128. 
10  Supra , note 5, at 729, para. 110. 
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principles, I will still argue that the remedial decisions of courts can be 
improved if judges recognize and attempt to avoid the dangers associ-
ated with both strong and rule-based discretion. Although there will be 
continued reasonable disagreement in the hardest of cases, remedial 
decision-making can be improved by avoiding the extremes of unfet-
tered discretion and overly fettered discretion. Principled exercise of 
remedial discretion is not a recipe for agreement or even reliably right 
answers, but it is a recipe for fuller reflection and reasons as judges 
attempt to justify particular remedial decisions in relation to general 
principles relating to the appropriate role of the courts in ensuring that 
there are meaningful remedies for violations of Charter rights. 
In the remaining parts of the paper, I will examine recent remedial 
decisions of the Supreme Court with the above categories in mind. My 
analysis of each case will attempt to recognize the range of debate about 
how the exercise of remedial discretion fits into the three categories of 
strong, rule-based, and principled discretion. At the same time, I will 
suggest some techniques that the courts might use to improve and 
sharpen their remedial decisions. Remedial decisions can usefully be 
evaluated on the basis of whether they escape the dangers of strong 
discretion by giving principled and purposive reasons and whether they 
escape the dangers of inflexible rules or pigeonholes by articulating the 
general principles that are relevant not only to the case at hand, but to 
other cases. This year’s remedial cases present a particularly rich field to 
discuss many of the most difficult remedial decisions made under the 
Charter. In the end, I hope to provide some ideas that will help make the 
exercise of discretion to order injunctions and to retain jurisdiction over 
a case, to award advance costs, and to suspend a declaration of invalid-
ity more principled and purposive. 
I.  REMEDIAL DISCRETION UNDER THE CHARTER 
1. The Importance of Remedial Discretion 
Remedial discretion is an important feature of the Charter. Section 
24 was placed in the Charter in no small part because Canadian courts 
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refused to exercise discretion under both the Canadian Bill of Rights11 
and the common law to award remedies such as the exclusion of im-
properly obtained evidence12 or a stay of proceedings.13 Remedial dis-
cretion is specifically provided in section 24(1) of the Charter, which 
contemplates such remedies being ordered “as the court considers ap-
propriate and just.” As McIntyre J. observed in R. v. Mills,14 “[i]t is 
difficult to imagine language which could give the court a wider and 
less fettered discretion. It is impossible to reduce this wide discretion to 
some sort of binding formula for general application in all cases, and it 
is not for appellate courts to pre-empt or cut down this wide discretion.” 
More recently, McLachlin C.J. has similarly observed that section 24(1) 
“appears to confer the widest possible discretion on a court to craft 
remedies for violations of Charter rights.”15  
On its face, section 52(1) of the Constitution Act mandates that un-
constitutional laws will be struck down, but the reference to declaring 
such laws of no force and effect “to the extent of the inconsistency” 
introduces considerable discretion as to whether the appropriate remedy 
is a blanket declaration of invalidity or whether a less drastic remedy 
such as reading down, reading in, exemption, or severance would better 
accord with the purposes of the impugned legislation and the Charter.16 
Finally, the ability of courts to suspend a declaration of invalidity intro-
duces another layer of discretion into the exercise of remedial decision-
making under section 52(1).17 
                                                                                                                                
11  R. v. Hogan, [1975] 2 S.C.R. 574. 
12  R. v. Wray, [1971] S.C.R. 272. 
13  R. v. Osborn, [1971] S.C.R. 184. 
14  [1986] 1 S.C.R. 863, at 965, [1986] S.C.J. No. 39. 
15  R. v. 974649 Ontario Inc. [2001] 3 S.C.R. 575, at para. 18, [2001] S.C.J. No. 79. 
16  Schachter v. Canada, supra, note 5. On this jurisprudence, see my Constitutional 
Remedies in Canada (Aurora, Ont.: Canada Law Book, 2003) at ch. 14. 
17  Interestingly, the South African Constitution, which has borrowed from the Cana-
dian experience of suspending declarations of invalidity, clearly contemplates considerable 
discretion in deciding whether to suspend a declaration of invalidity and in determining the 
terms on which the suspension will be made. See South Africa Constitution, s. 172(1), which 
provides: 
When deciding a constitutional matter within its power, a court — 
a) must declare that any law or conduct that is inconsistent with the Constitution 
is invalid to the extent of its inconsistency; and 
b) may make any order that is just and equitable, including — 
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2. Types of Remedial Discretion  
Although remedial discretion seems at one level to be an undeniable 
fact under the Charter, it is one that requires justification. The ambigu-
ous nature of the trial judge’s remedial discretion is demonstrated in the 
jurisprudence concerning appellate deference to issues of remedial 
choice. Appellate courts will not generally evaluate a remedy on a de 
novo basis. At the same time, they will intervene if the trial judge erred 
in setting out the relevant legal test, was clearly wrong, or gave reasons 
that were “so brief and conclusionary that it is difficult to say whether 
other errors were made.”18 This year, the Court has further emphasized 
the need for qualified appellate deference to a trial judge’s exercise of 
remedial discretion. In Buhay,19 the Court deferred to the trial judge’s 
decision to exclude evidence under section 24(2) on the basis that it was 
not “unreasonable nor based upon an error or a misapprehension of the 
applicable law.” In Doucet-Boudreau,20 the majority emphasized that in 
evaluating section 24(1) remedies “[r]eviewing courts … must show 
considerable deference to trial judges’ choice of remedy, and should 
refrain from using hindsight to perfect a remedy. A reviewing court 
should only interfere where the trial judge has committed an error of law 
or principle.” 
Recent debates among scholars of private law remedies about the 
degree to which equitable remedies are discretionary or rule-based may 
be helpful in clarifying the nature of remedial discretion, as well as the 
controversial nature of the enterprise. Professor Peter Birks has argued 
that remedial decision-making must be ruled-based in order to promote 
certainty in the law and accord with the ideal of the rule of law.21  
                                                                                                                                
1) an order limiting the retrospective effect of the declaration of invalidity; 
and 
2) an order suspending the declaration of invalidity for any period and on 
any conditions, to allow the competent authority to correct the defect. 
18  R. v. Feeney, [1997] 2 S.C.R. 13, at para. 84, [1997] S.C.J. No. 49. 
19  Supra, note 8, at para. 48. 
20  Supra, note 1, at para. 87. 
21  Peter Birks, “Rights, Wrongs and Remedies” (2000) 20 O.J.L.S. 1, at 36-37; Peter 
Birks, “Three Kinds of Objections to Discretionary Remedialism” (2000) 29 W. Aust. L. Rev. 
1; Darryn Jenson, “The Rights and Wrongs of Discretionary Remedialism” (2003) Sing. J. of 
Legal Studies 178. 
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Others, however, defend so-called “discretionary remedialism”22 on the 
basis of the impossibility of avoiding the need for judgment and flexibil-
ity in remedial decision-making. Although proponents of rule-based 
remedial decision-making raise the spectre of unfettered remedial deci-
sion-making, many of the advocates of discretionary remedialism sup-
port a more restrained and less positivistic form of discretion. They 
advocate what Ronald Dworkin describes as a “weak” form of discre-
tion that is governed by legal principles as opposed to a “strong” form 
of discretion that applies “when a judge runs out of rules.” Professor 
Dworkin sees principles as “standards that reasonable men can interpret 
in different ways”23 and contrasts them with rules that, in his view, have 
a more self-executing or categorical nature. Multiple principles can be 
relevant to a judicial decision and must be weighed by the judges, 
whereas a legal rule as conceived by Dworkin either applies or does not. 
To be sure, Dworkin’s distinctions between weak and strong forms of 
discretion and between rules and principles are controversial, and they 
may discount the need for interpretation in applying rules. Nevertheless, 
as will be seen, they provide a helpful guide to conceptualizing remedial 
discretion under the Charter. 
(a) Strong Remedial Discretion 
The idea of strong discretion is based on a positivistic sense that at 
some point the rules run out, and this gives the judge unconstrained 
freedom to make a decision by exercising discretion. Such a discretion 
seems anomalous in a legal regime committed to the rule of law and the 
protection of rights. Peter Birks, for example, has argued that “the whole 
point of the rule of law” is to avoid rule on the basis of “the wills and 
whims of a person or a group of people. The blessings of this commit-
ment [to the rule of law] have been overlooked by the discretionary 
remedialists who suddenly suppose that the judges should be the one 
                                                                                                                                
22  Simon Evans, “Defending Discretionary Remedialism” (2001) 23 Sydney L. Rev. 
463, at 480ff; Patricia Loughlan, “No Right to a Remedy? An Analysis of Judicial Discretion 
in the Imposition of Equitable Remedies” (1989) 17 Melb. L. Rev. 132. 
23  Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1977), at 69, 34. 
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group answerable only to God.”24 To be sure, the idea of strong discre-
tion sits uneasily with the ideals of the rule of law and the concept that 
where there is a right, there is a remedy.25 At the same time, it is perhaps 
unfair to castigate strong discretion as simply a matter of will and whim. 
Remedial discretion is, at the end of the day, exercised by judges who 
are constrained by their institutional role to act in an impartial manner. 
A judge who exercises strong discretion is not necessarily immune from 
criticism that the discretion has been exercised unfairly or unwisely.26 
As will be seen, there are some areas of constitutional remedies that 
at present seem to be exercised on the basis of strong discretion. Exam-
ples might include the discretion of a judge not to award an equitable 
remedy27 or the discretion of a provincial superior court to decline juris-
diction in a case which could be heard by the Federal Court.28 Some 
might also argue that suspended or delayed declarations of invalidity 
have become a matter of pure discretion as courts, including the Su-
preme Court, have ignored the restriction set out in Schachter v. Can-
ada29 on their use and have employed them in a wide variety of cases. 
Less controversially, the choice of the period for which the suspension 
will apply also seems to be a matter of pure or strong discretion. Some-
times the Supreme Court suspends a declaration of invalidity for 6 
months, sometimes for 12 months, and sometimes for 18 months. In 
2003, the Supreme Court suspended declarations of invalidity for a 
period of 12 months in two cases,30 but for 6 months in a third case,31 
                                                                                                                                
24  Peter Birks, “Three Kinds of Objections to Discretionary Remedialism” supra, note 
21, at 15. 
25  Professor Birks argues that “discretionary remedialism cannot allow the plaintiff to 
have rights. To make room for the discretion it has to reduce the plaintiff to a supplicant seeking 
the exercise if a discretion in his favour. He cannot be heard to demand rights.” Id., at 13. 
26  Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, supra, note 23, at 33. 
27  Chippewas of Sarnia Band v. Canada (Attorney General) (2000), 195 D.L.R. (4th) 
135, [2003] O.J. No. 4804 (C.A.), leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused (2001), 158 O.A.C. 199 
(note). But for a discussion of the basis on which this discretion should be exercised and the 
need to relate the exercise of the discretion to legal principles, see my “Remedies in Aborigi-
nal Litigations” in Magnet & Dorey, eds., Aboriginal Rights Litigation (Toronto: Butter-
worths, 2003),  at 323-26. 
28  Reza v. Canada (Minister of Employment & Immigration), [1994] 2 S.C.R. 394, 
[1994] S.C.J. No. 49. 
29  Supra, note 5. 
30  Trociuk v. British Columbia (Attorney General), supra, note 4; Figueroa v. Canada 
(Attorney General), supra, note 4. 
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with no rationale given to explain the difference. Generally, no reasons 
are given to explain the choice of time.32 One of the hallmarks of pure 
discretion is that it need not be accompanied by reasons. Reasons are 
generally seen as means to relate a legal decision to some applicable 
rule or principle, and are superfluous when there are no such standards.  
(b) Rule-Based Remedial Discretion 
Rule-based discretion can be seen as an (over) reaction to the dan-
gers of pure or strong discretion. The idea behind rule-based discretion 
is that appellate courts should formulate rules that will outline the cir-
cumstances in which trial judges should exercise their remedial discre-
tion. Dworkin defines rules as “applicable in an all-or-nothing fashion.” 
This means that “if the facts a rule stipulates are given” and the rule is 
validly on point then “the answer it supplies must be accepted.”33 His 
example of a rule is that a will must be witnessed by three persons to be 
valid. Dworkin may lean towards something of a caricature of rules, but 
as will be seen, there are some examples of courts taking such a seem-
ingly categorical approach to issues of remedial discretion.  
One value of rules is that they can promote certainty about the law, 
provided that it is clear what rule applies, and the judge is faithful to the 
result required by the rule. Unlike strong discretion, the application of 
rules also often invites and requires reasons from the judge. The rea-
sons, however, will be focused on whether the conditions precedent to 
the rule apply or perhaps whether a conflicting rule applies. In some 
cases, reasoning about whether a rule applies will cause greater reflec-
tion about the purposes and principles that are at stake, but often reasons 
will end at the issue of whether the case at hand is sufficiently analo-
gous to the cases contemplated by the rule that the rule should apply.  
As will be seen, there are some areas of constitutional remedies that 
seem at present to be based on rules. One example would be the original 
rule in Schachter34 which suggests that suspended or delayed declarations 
                                                                                                                                
31  Nova Scotia (Workers’ Compensation Board) v. Martin, supra, note 4. 
32  But see Corbiere v. Canada (Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs), [1999] 2 
S.C.R. 203, [1999] S.C.J. No. 24 for an explanation of an 18-month delay. 
33  Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, supra, note 23, at 24. 
34  Supra, note 5. 
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of invalidity are extraordinary and should be reserved to cases in which 
an immediate declaration of invalidity would threaten the rule of law or 
public safety, or deprive someone of a benefit that is only unconstitu-
tional in the sense that it is underinclusive. When courts apply this rule, 
they generally focus on whether the case at hand is analogous to the 
three categories presented by the rule in Schachter. As mentioned 
above, the Stillman35 test for the exclusion of evidence can also be seen 
as rule-based in the sense that it requires the exclusion of evidence that 
satisfies the definition of conscriptive evidence, sometimes defined as 
statements and bodily substances obtained unconstitutionally from the 
accused. Again, reasons in such cases will usually focus on whether 
unconstitutionally obtained evidence in the particular case satisfies the 
definition of conscriptive evidence. If it does, it is excluded without 
much discussion of the underlying rationale or principle that explains or 
justifies the rule.36 
Resistance to inflexible rules may produce a situation that gravitates 
towards strong discretion. The reason for this is that rules often focus on 
particular factual conditions precedent and not the underlying reasons 
why the conditions should have those consequences. Both strong discre-
tion and rule-based discretion can be united by relative inattention to 
underlying principles. This may explain why the Schachter rules have 
been both unstable and unpredictable. Either judges determine whether 
the case at hand fits into the three examples provided by the Court, as 
did the Ontario Court of Appeal in the gay marriage case,37 or the judge 
ignores the rule and decides, as a matter of strong discretion, and often 
without any real reasons, either to suspend or not suspend the declara-
tion of invalidity.  
                                                                                                                                
35  Supra, note 8. 
36  For an argument that a definitional approach to conscriptive evidence can discount 
the importance of the underlying principle of whether the evidence was unobtained through 
an unfair process of self-incrimination see my Constitutional Remedies in Canada, supra, 
note 16, at 10.1210-10.1225, and my “Here We Go Again: Reviving the Real Evidence 
Distinction under Section 24(2)” (1999) 42 C.L.Q. 397.  
37  Halpern v. Canada (Attorney General) (sub nom. Halpern v. Ontario; Halpern v. 
Toronto (City)) (2003), 225 D.L.R. (4th) 529, [2003] O.J. No. 2268 (C.A.). 
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(c) Principled Remedial Discretion 
An alternative to either strong or rule-based remedial discretion is 
principled remedial discretion. Dworkin’s account of principles suggests 
that they are more general and in some ways controversial than rules. 
Dworkin’s theory is best known for its distinction between rights-based 
principles and collective policies and the demanding obligation to seek 
right answers in hard cases. What is perhaps less well-known is his 
sense that there are multiple principles and policies that can be consid-
ered in a particular case, and that judges must decide the weight of any 
principle in a particular case. Dworkin has a more modest description of 
principles, not as full-blown right answers, but as something “which 
officials must take into account, if it is relevant, as a consideration in-
clining in one direction or another.” On this account, a judge is “re-
quired to assess all of the competing and conflicting principles” that 
bear on a case and “make a resolution of these principles rather than 
identifying one among others as ‘valid’.”38 This account of multiple 
principles, though perhaps not entirely consistent with Dworkin’s ulti-
mate aspiration for a right answer through adjudication, allows for a 
more meaningful distinction between rule-based and principled remedial 
discretion. It opens up the space for judges to consider multiple princi-
ples — such as the need for an effective remedy and the need to respect 
the institutional role of the judiciary — when deciding questions of 
remedies without attempting to formulate particular rules about the 
circumstances in which one of these principles will have greater weight 
or when particular remedies should be ordered. 
The idea that even the exercise of remedial discretion under the 
Charter can be principled is a compelling aspiration. It promises that 
something of the same methodology that is applied to determining the 
content of the rights and the justification of any limit on the right can 
also be applied to remedial decision-making. In this sense, it unites the 
process of determining rights and remedies. At the same time, it allows 
us to make sense of the fact that trial judges have a discretion to formu-
late appropriate and just remedies in particular circumstances.  
                                                                                                                                
38  Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, supra, note 23, at 26, 72. 
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There are some areas of constitutional remedies that gravitate to-
wards a principled approach to Charter remedies. In R. v. Gamble,39 
Wilson J. stressed the connections between the process of interpreting 
rights and devising remedies when she stated that “[a] purposive ap-
proach should, in my view, be applied to the administration of Charter 
remedies as well as to the interpretation of Charter rights….Charter 
relief should not be denied or ‘displaced by overly rigid rules’.” At 
various junctures, the Supreme Court has stressed that remedies should 
vindicate the purposes of particular Charter rights. In Osborne v. Can-
ada,40 the Court expressed the importance of selecting a remedy that 
would vindicate the values of freedom of expression. In Schachter v. 
Canada,41 the Court indicated that “[t]he absolute unavailability of read-
ing in would mean that the standards developed under the Charter 
would have to be applied in certain cases in ways which would derogate 
from the deeper social purposes of the Charter.” In that case, the Court 
took a principled approach to the remedial choice between reading in 
and a declaration of invalidity by basing it on the general principles of 
the need to respect the role of the legislature and the purposes of the 
Charter. To be sure, these general principles require further interpreta-
tion and application, but they provide a better and more general frame-
work than the rule-based approach taken in Schachter to the separate 
question of when a declaration of invalidity should be suspended. 
A principled approach to the exercise of remedial discretion might 
be impractical if it demanded that only one principle was relevant to any 
particular exercise of remedial discretion. Fortunately, it is easier to 
accept the idea of multiple and competing purposes and policies than it 
is multiple and competing rules. Once it is accepted that a principled 
approach can implicate more than one principle, it is possible to see the 
Court’s frequent attention to the need to respect the proper role of legis-
latures, the executive and the judiciary, to balance competing interests, 
and to provide effective remedies as a principled approach to remedial 
decision-making.42 A principled and purposive approach to the exercise 
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of remedial discretion does not necessarily mean that the court will 
select the remedy that maximizes the relevant right in all cases. Rather it 
requires that judges consider all of the relevant and at times competing 
principles and attempt to order the best remedy possible. It also requires 
that judges attempt to justify their selection of remedies in a manner that 
fits with the general interpretative approach taken to determining the 
scope of rights and reasonable limits under the Charter. 
3. Summary 
The three approaches to the exercise of remedial discretion outlined 
above can be seen as a spectrum. 
 
 Rule Principle Strong Discretion  
 
A rule-based and strong discretion approach are set at the opposite 
ends of the spectrum because they recognize the extremes of either 
control or freedom of the trial judge, but they also are united by their 
relevant neglect of the issue of general principles. As will be suggested 
below, a frequent reaction to the inflexibility of rule-based discretion is 
to exercise strong discretion by ignoring the rules. The spectrum ap-
proach is also helpful because it demonstrates that particular decisions 
may lie on the borderline of the categories. For example, a rule-based 
approach may lean towards principle to the extent that interpretation and 
application of the rules engages broader and more general questions 
about the purposes of the rules. A principled approach may lean towards 
strong discretion to the extent that it emphasizes appellate deference to 
the trial judge’s choice of remedy.  
In the remaining parts of this paper, I will examine some recent re-
medial decisions made by the Supreme Court. At first, I will describe 
the decision made by the Court and later I will evaluate the decision 
with reference to the above categories of strong, rule-based, and princi-
pled remedial discretion. In many cases, the question of whether the 
decision amounts to a principled and purposive approach to remedial 
decision-making could be the subject of reasonable disagreement. Nev-
ertheless my hope is that remedial decision-making can be improved by 
attempting to avoid the excesses of, on the one hand, strong and unfet-
tered discretion and, on the other hand, discretion that is mechanically 
guided by self-applying rules. At the same time, I recognize that multiple 
114  Supreme Court Law Review (2004), 25 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
 
principles are usually in play when a court fashions an appropriate and 
just remedy. Judges will have to use good judgment in order to reconcile 
these multiple and sometimes competing principles into a remedial 
decision that demonstrates awareness of all the relevant factors, and 
attempts to justify the exercise of remedial discretion in light of these 
factors.  
II.  DOUCET-BOUDREAU AND THE DISCRETION TO ORDER 
INJUNCTIONS AND RETAIN JURISDICTION 
1. The Judgment 
In the case of Doucet-Boudreau, the trial judge concluded that Nova 
Scotia had violated its requirement to provide minority language facili-
ties in five regions of the province. The evidence suggested that between 
1982 and 1997, the Department of Education had not accorded a priority 
to section 23 of the Charter or the assimilation of the Francophone mi-
nority when assessing priorities for new schools. The trial judge re-
quired that the respondents use their “best efforts” to comply with 
various deadlines in each of the regions and indicated that “[t]he Court 
shall retain jurisdiction to hear reports from the Respondents respecting 
the Respondents’ compliance with this Order. The Respondents shall 
report to this Court on March 23, 2001 at 9:30 a.m., or on such other 
date as the Court may determine.”43 Several such reporting sessions 
were held in which the Department of Education, upon the judge’s re-
quest, submitted affidavits detailing progress in school construction, and 
the other parties were also given an opportunity to adduce evidence. 
The Crown appealed only the retention of jurisdiction in the case 
and in a 2:1 decision, the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal held that the trial 
judge had erred in retaining jurisdiction after he was functus officio. 
Justice of Appeal Flinn, for the majority, distinguished the Manitoba 
Language Reference44 on the basis that the trial judge in this case had 
not left any issues, such as the deadlines for compliance, outstanding. 
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He also stressed that there was no specific statutory authorization for the 
retention of jurisdiction, and expressed concerns that the trial judge 
acted as an administrator as opposed to a judge at the reporting sessions 
and that this may strain “harmonious relations”45 between the judicial 
and other branches of government. Justice of Appeal Freeman in dissent 
would have upheld the trial judge’s exercise of remedial discretion, 
concluding that it was a “creative blending of declaratory and injunctive 
relief with a means of mediation.”46 In his view, the trial judge’s remedy 
had the practical benefit of allowing a judge familiar with the issues to 
“expedite implementation of the order in a variety of ways, not least of 
which being provision of a means of mediating disputes inevitable in 
carrying out the complex requirements of the order.”47 
The Supreme Court decided 5:4 to uphold the trial judge’s remedy. 
Justices Iacobucci and Arbour, for the majority, stressed the important 
role of provincial superior courts and their inherent jurisdiction to award 
remedies, a power that “cannot be strictly limited by statutes or rules of 
the common law.”48 This power was not, however, absolute or unre-
viewable because it “must be read in harmony with the rest of our Con-
stitution.”49 To this end, a remedy should be effective and meaningful 
having regard to the right and its violation; it “must strive to respect the 
relationships with and separation of functions among the legislature, the 
executive and the judiciary”;50 it must call on “the function and powers 
of the court”;51 and finally, it must also be “fair to the party against 
whom the order is made.”52 The Court concluded that the trial judge’s 
remedy was designed to prevent further procedural delay in vindicating 
rights long denied to the minority. The Court also noted that the remedy 
respected the role of the different institutions because it left the  
“detailed choices of means largely to the executive.”53 Although more 
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49  Id., at para. 50. 
50  Id., at para. 56. 
51  Id., at para. 57. 
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precision may have been desirable, the remedy was not fundamentally 
unfair to the government because it was not unduly vague and it could 
be appealed. Finally, the majority stressed that appellate courts “must 
show considerable deference to trial judges’ choice of remedy, and 
should refrain from using hindsight to perfect a remedy. A reviewing 
court should only interfere where the trial judge has committed an error 
of law or principle.”54 
In a judgment by LeBel and Deschamps JJ., the minority of the 
Court concluded that the trial judge had erred by breaching the separa-
tion of powers; by retaining jurisdiction after he was functus; and by 
making an order that was so vague as to be procedurally unfair. Specifi-
cally, the minority held that if the trial judge was prepared to make 
further orders at the reporting session, he violated the separation of 
powers by entering into the realm of “administrative supervision and 
decision making.”55 It stressed that such a managerial role did not ac-
cord with the institutional capabilities of the judiciary or with “the Ca-
nadian tradition of mutual respect between the judiciary and the 
institutions that are the repository of democratic will.”56 If anything, the 
minority was even more critical of what the trial judge did if, as ac-
cepted by the majority of the Court, he was only holding reporting ses-
sions and not contemplating additions or amendments to his original 
order. In that case, LeBel and Deschamps JJ., asserted that the trial 
judge was acting in a “political”57 manner akin to the pressure that an 
opposition party places on a government. Instead of the reporting ses-
sions, which they argued contemplated “an inappropriate, ongoing su-
pervisory and investigative role,”58 the trial judge should have waited 
for the applicants to have commenced an application for contempt of 
court for violating his remedial order. The availability of the contempt 
sanction in the minority’s view ensured that the trial judge’s remedy 
would have been effective without the retention of jurisdiction or the 
reporting requirement. 
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2. The Judgment and the Three Models of Discretion 
Doucet-Boudreau is an interesting and important case in no small 
part because both the majority and the minority focus on many of the 
important issues of principle that animate the exercise of remedial dis-
cretion under the Charter. For the majority, the principle with the great-
est weight was the need to provide a remedy that was effective and 
meaningful for the applicants. They advocated a purposive approach to 
remedies that  
requires at least two things. First, the purpose of the right being 
protected must be promoted: courts must craft responsive remedies. 
Second, the purpose of the remedies provision must be promoted: 
courts must craft effective remedies.59  
The idea that remedies must be responsive and effective are broad goals 
or principles; they do not produce self-executing results in the manner 
of rules. The majority’s focus on the right being protected and the con-
text of the violation also explains why it spends considerably more time 
than the minority judgment in discussing the purposes of section 23 of 
the Charter and the particular nature of the violation caused by contin-
ued governmental neglect of the right to minority language education.  
The majority did not view the principle of full and effective reme-
dies as the only principle at stake in exercising remedial discretion un-
der section 24(1) of the Charter. The competing principles can be 
grouped into two categories. The first is the need to respect the proper 
relationship with other parts of government with the concomitant con-
cern of ensuring that the remedy remains suited to the judicial function. 
It is significant to the majority that the trial judge was exercising the 
constitutionally protected jurisdiction of a provincial superior court. 
Justices Iacobucci and Arbour concluded that statutory and common law 
rules limiting the remedial powers of courts, as well as the jurisprudence 
that determines whether inferior tribunals have jurisdiction over a rem-
edy requested under section 24(1) of the Charter, do not apply to the 
exercise of discretion by provincial superior courts under section 24(1) 
of the Charter.60 The majority takes much less of a rule-based approach 
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than the minority to the question of whether the remedy is compatible 
with the separation of powers. It warns that there is no “bright line” 
separating judicial, executive, and legislative “functions in all cases.”61 
The restraint of requiring a judicial remedy means not that courts may 
never exercise a legislative or administrative function, but rather that 
“[i]t will not be appropriate for a court to leap into the kinds of decisions 
and functions for which its design and expertise are manifestly un-
suited.”62 The majority signals that the principle of effective and respon-
sive remedies will have greater weight than the principle of respecting 
institutional roles when it makes the evocative statement that 
“[d]eference ends … where the constitutional rights that the courts are 
charged with protecting begin.”63 
The second competing principle is that constitutional remedies must 
be fair to the government. The majority seems to concede that the trial 
judge’s remedy could have been fairer to the government had it been 
more specific about what was required. It indicates that the parties could 
have been given more guidance as to what would happen at the report-
ing session, and a specified timetable. In the end, however, the majority 
concludes that “reporting order was not vaguely worded so as to render 
it invalid.”64 In reaching this conclusion, the majority relies heavily on 
the concept of appellate deference to the discretion of a trial judge who 
is “not required to identify the single best remedy, even if that were 
possible.”65 An emphasis on appellate deference, and especially the idea 
that even the trial judge does not have a duty to seek the best remedy 
possible, moves from the realm of principled remedial discretion in the 
direction of strong discretion. 
The majority’s decision on the fairness point could in my view have 
been improved by more focus on context, principle, and alternative 
remedies. The remedial environment was complex and dynamic because 
it involved five different school regions in the province, and a new gov-
ernment had just come into power. Given the minority’s extraordinary 
criticism of their colleagues as sanctioning a “political” remedy, I hasten 
to add that the change of government is not relevant in a partisan politi-
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cal sense, but because of functional concerns about delays that can result 
from power transitions. The majority also underestimates that the trial 
judge did indeed establish target deadlines for the construction of 
French language schools in all five regions. The fairness of the trial 
judge’s remedy is in my view best revealed by the fact that the reporting 
sessions were an alternative to waiting until a deadline had been missed 
and then holding a contempt hearing. The government and its officials 
were not in jeopardy at the reporting sessions of being found in con-
tempt and this speaks to the fairness of the less-structured procedure 
used by the trial judge. In general, remedies will be better justified by 
consideration of the relevant principles and contexts and not by reliance 
on appellate deference. Although appellate courts should recognize that 
there may be a range of reasonable remedial choices that can be made 
without error, they should not send a signal to trial judges that they are 
not obliged to attempt, however difficult that may be, to devise the “sin-
gle best remedy.” Remedial discretion under the Charter should not be 
conceived of a matter in which a judge “has no duty to decide one way 
or the other, but rather a permission … to decide either way.”66  
On the spectrum of discretion outlined in the first part of this paper, 
the majority roots itself in principle, but leans more toward strong than 
to ruled-based discretion. When appellate courts consider remedial deci-
sion-making, it may well be best for them to err on the side of strong 
rather than rule-based discretion because of the unforeseen circum-
stances that may be encountered by trial judges and the comparative 
advantages that trial judges have in devising remedies because of their 
familiarity with all the evidence, the parties, and local circumstances.67 
As suggested above, however, this should not be taken as an endorse-
ment of strong discretion by trial judges and it does not relieve trial 
judges of their obligation to consider all the relevant legal principles and 
give full reasons to explain their decisions. Trial judges should aim at 
ordering the best remedy and one that is supported by consideration and 
weighing of the relevant purposes and principles. 
The minority in Doucet-Boudreau, like the majority, focuses on the 
principles of effective remedies, respect for the separation of powers, 
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and procedural fairness in its evaluation of the trial judge’s remedy. 
Although there is obvious disagreement about the contours and weight 
of these principles among the nine judges, it is a positive sign of the 
growing maturity of remedial jurisprudence that all nine judges agree 
that the remedy should be evaluated in relation to the same broad 
principles. 
The minority gives considerably less weight than the majority to the 
principle of effective and meaningful remedies. The judgment of LeBel 
and Deschamps JJ. starts with the declaration that “the devil is in the 
details” and proceeds through a discussion of the drafting of the order in 
relation to the principle of procedural fairness, and various restraints on 
the appropriate role of the judiciary including the doctrine of functus 
officio. The issue of the effectiveness of the trial judge’s remedy is ad-
dressed only towards the end of their judgment where they assert that 
“[i]f the claimants felt that the government was not complying with any 
part of the order, then they could have brought an application for con-
tempt.”68 One problem with reliance on the possibility of contempt 
applications to ensure an effective remedy is, on the facts of the case, it 
is not clear that they were available. There was some ambiguity about 
whether the trial judge’s remedy constituted a declaration or an injunc-
tion. Moreover as the majority conceded and as the minority itself 
stressed, there was some concern about the vagueness of the “best ef-
forts” order. In Little Sisters,69 the majority of the Court emphasized the 
need for precision should injunctions, including structural injunctions, 
be used. Given the need for a clear order and breach of that order before 
a person or an organization can fairly be found in contempt of court, it is 
doubtful that the trial judge’s remedy could actually have been enforced 
through contempt. If the trial judge’s order was too vague to be enforced 
through contempt, then it is illogical and unconvincing for the minority 
to claim that the availability of contempt would have made the trial 
judge’s order effective without the reporting requirements. In any event, 
the minority in my view did not devote sufficient attention to the fun-
damental principle that constitutional remedies must be effective and 
meaningful. 
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The minority’s discussion of the principle of the separation of pow-
ers and limits of judicial power leans heavily in the direction of a rule 
that would preclude the use of supervisory jurisdiction and structural 
injunctions. This conclusion is surprising given that two of the four 
judges in the minority — Major and Binnie JJ. — seemed in Binnie J.’s 
majority judgment in Little Sisters v. Canada70 to leave open the possi-
bility that structural injunctions may be “helpful” in the appropriate 
case. In Doucet-Boudreau, the minority comes quite close to articulating 
a rule that would prohibit such structural relief when it stated: 
In our view, if a court intervenes, as here, in matters of administration 
properly entrusted to the executive, it exceeds its proper sphere and 
thereby breaches the separation of powers. By crossing the boundary 
between judicial acts and administrative oversight, it acts 
illegitimately and without jurisdiction. Such a crossing of the 
boundary cannot be characterized as relief that is “appropriate and just 
in the circumstances” within the meaning of section 24(1) of the 
Charter. 
… 
By purporting to be able to make subsequent orders, the trial judge 
would have assumed a supervisory role which included administrative 
functions that properly lie in the sphere of the executive. These 
functions are beyond the capacities of courts. 
… 
the executive should after a judicial finding of a breach, retain 
autonomy in administering government policy that conforms with the 
Charter.71  
To be sure this conclusion is rooted in the minority’s interpretation 
of an important principle, namely the separation of powers and the lim-
its of the judicial function. In some other parts of the judgment this idea 
is also hedged in by qualifiers such as the statement that “courts should, 
as a general rule, avoid interfering in the management of public 
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administration.”72 Nevertheless, the minority judgment leans towards an 
absolute rule against structural injunctions. 
Some principles may be strong enough to justify an absolute rule, 
but in many other contexts, the Court has been shy about articulating 
any absolute rule. For example, the Court has even refused to articulate 
an absolute rule that extradition to face the death penalty or deportation 
to face torture will violate the Constitution.73 Given this, can the more or 
less absolute rule proposed by the minority against structural injunctions 
be justified? In my view, it cannot. As discussed above, the minority 
gives inadequate weight to the principle of effective remedies and as-
sumes that contempt citations will be sufficient to ensure government 
compliance with any court order. One problem with this assumption is 
that it discounts the inherently complex and polycentric nature of public 
law litigation. The minority operates on the assumption that a failure to 
comply with a court order will be the result of deliberate disobedience 
that can be cured by fining the government or jailing the responsible 
officials for contempt. The problem is that a failure to comply with 
constitutional standards can be caused by a wide range of factors includ-
ing incompetence and unforeseen circumstances. For example, what 
would have happened to the deadlines in the trial judge’s order if there 
had been a major public sector or construction strike in Nova Scotia? In 
such circumstances it would have been unfair to have fined the govern-
ment or its officials for factors outside their control. It would, however, 
have been appropriate and just for the trial judge to revisit the order in 
light of the changed circumstances and to have issued revised and sup-
plementary orders. The Supreme Court has itself issued such supple-
mentary orders in response to new information about the difficulties of 
translating Manitoba’s laws into French.74 It has also extended transition 
periods or periods of a suspended declaration of invalidity in light of 
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changed circumstances.75 The minority does not deal adequately with 
this experience and ignores the analogous supervisory jurisdiction exer-
cised by the court in a range of private law matters, a point that the 
majority stresses.76 The minority’s decision is based on a narrow and 
absolute understanding of the separation of powers that does not fit 
either previous constitutional cases or the traditional role of courts of 
equity.  
Another factor that undermines the minority judgment is that it does 
not consider how other principles may affect its rule against the reten-
tion of supervisory jurisdiction and structural injunctions. As discussed 
above, such a rule sits uneasily with the principle of effective and re-
sponsive remedies. In addition, it sits uneasily with the concern about 
preserving a proper relationship between courts and governments. As 
the majority notes, the alternative remedy relied upon by the minority, 
the contempt citation, is in tension with the traditional relationship be-
tween Canadian courts and governments. Reliance on contempt citations 
could cause greater harm to the relationship between courts and gov-
ernments than the retention of jurisdiction and the conduct of reporting 
sessions.  
The minority’s opinion well demonstrates a weakness of a rule-
based approach. Once a rule applies, it is self-executing without atten-
tion to competing rules or principles. In contrast, as Dworkin suggests, a 
principled approach will lend itself more easily to judicial consideration 
of competing principles and policies. Again, reasonable people may 
disagree about the respective weight attached to the competing princi-
ples, but a judicial opinion will be more persuasive and have greater 
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legitimacy if it appears to have considered all of the relevant competing 
principles. In my view, the minority’s opinion leans excessively towards 
a rule against judicial supervision without adequate consideration of 
how such a rule will affect the principles of effective and meaningful 
remedies or the maintenance of a proper relation between the court and 
governments. 
In the end, it is a positive sign that all the judges in Doucet-
Boudreau root their decisions in the principles of effective remedies, 
respect for institutional role, and procedural fairness. Moreover it should 
not be surprising that reasonable people will disagree about the applica-
tion of these principles or the proper weight to be given to them. The 
majority’s opinion could have been improved by curbing a tendency to 
move in the direction of strong discretion. Although there is a need for 
appellate courts to defer to a trial judge’s ability to determine what rem-
edy is appropriate and just in all the circumstances, care should be taken 
not to suggest that trial judges do not have a legal duty both to consider 
all the relevant principles and to search for the best remedy. At the same 
time, the minority opinion moves even more than the majority judgment 
away from a focus on the relevant remedial principles. The minority 
strays not toward strong discretion, but rather in the direction of rule-
based discretion. Justices LeBel and Deschamps came very close to 
articulating an absolute rule that would preclude trial judges from retain-
ing supervisory jurisdiction and issuing structural injunctions. This 
absolute rule does not fit with the remedial experience in both public 
and private law including cases such as the Manitoba Language Refer-
ence77 in which the Supreme Court itself has retained jurisdiction and 
modified its own orders. It also does not fit with the comparable experi-
ence of not only the United States, but many other countries including 
India and South Africa, which have recognized the legitimacy of courts 
retaining supervisory jurisdiction in constitutional cases.78 Most impor-
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tantly, from the perspective of the search for a principled approach to 
the exercise of remedial discretion, an absolute rule against structural 
injunctions pays inadequate attention to the principle of the need for 
effective remedies.  
III.  OKANAGAN INDIAN BAND AND THE DISCRETION  
TO AWARD ADVANCE COSTS 
1. The Judgment 
In British Columbia (Minister of Forests) v. Okanagan Indian 
Band,79 Aboriginal bands applied to a judge of the British Columbia 
Supreme Court for an order of advance or interim costs. They wished to 
argue that orders to stop them from logging violated their Aboriginal 
title to the land and the right to log on the land, as authorized by their 
tribal councils. The trial judge found that he had “a limited discretion in 
appropriate circumstances to award interim costs” but this case “falls far 
outside that area” in large part because of the risk of prejudging the 
complex case which required a trial.80 He rejected arguments that sec-
tion 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 or a fiduciary duty approach re-
quired the award of advance costs. He expressed sympathy for the plight 
of the impoverished bands who faced possible legal bills close to $1 
million, and the hope that governments would supply funding or counsel 
might take the case on a contingency basis. 
The British Columbia Court of Appeal allowed the appeal on the 
basis that the trial judge had misjudged the nature of his discretion to 
award advance costs and in particular had over-emphasized the danger 
of prejudging the case. The Court of Appeal agreed with the trial judge 
that there was no section 35 Aboriginal right or fiduciary duty that re-
quired the payment of advance costs. At the same time, the Court of 
Appeal indicated that these considerations were important background 
factors that supported its conclusion that there were exceptional circum-
stances to justify the order of advance costs.81 
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The Supreme Court upheld the Court of Appeal’s order for advance 
costs in a 6:3 decision. Justice LeBel, for the majority, related the pre-
sent law on advance costs in family, trust, bankruptcy, and corporate 
cases to a general principle, namely the need “to avoid unfairness by 
enabling impecunious litigants to pursue meritorious claims with which 
they would not otherwise be able to proceed.”82 He also examined how 
this principle would be applied to public interest litigation. To this end, 
he took notice of how courts in some Charter cases have departed from 
the normal rule of costs following the event and have even on occasion 
awarded costs to an unsuccessful Charter applicant.83 
Justice LeBel formulated three conditions that should be present for 
an award of interim costs in public interest litigation, namely: 
1. The party seeking interim costs genuinely cannot afford to pay for 
the litigation, and no other realistic option exists for bringing the 
issues to trial — in short, the litigation would be unable to 
proceed if the order were not made. 
2. The claim to be adjudicated is prima facie meritorious; that is, the 
claim is at least of sufficient merit that it is contrary to the 
interests of justice for the opportunity to pursue the case to be 
forfeited just because the litigant lacks financial means. 
3. The issues raised transcend the individual interests of the 
particular litigant, are of public importance, and have not been 
resolved in previous cases.84 
He indicated that satisfaction of these three criteria would not auto-
matically justify the award of advance costs. Trial judges still had a 
discretion not to order advance costs. Justice LeBel provided some guid-
ance for how this discretion should be exercised when he indicated that 
care should be taken not to impose “an unfair burden” on “private liti-
gants who may, in some ways, be caught in the crossfire of disputes 
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which, essentially, involve the relationship between the claimants and 
certain public authorities, or the effect of laws of general application.”85 
The majority stressed that appellate courts should defer to the trial 
judge’s exercise of discretion unless it was based on legal error or “a 
palpable error” in factual assessment.86 In this case, the trial judge had 
so erred by placing too much emphasis on a concern that advance costs 
would create an appearance of prejudgment, and in concluding that 
alternative forms of funding such as contingency fees were viable in the 
circumstances. The Supreme Court determined that the advance costs 
awarded by the Court of Appeal were appropriate.87 
Justice Major wrote the dissent with the concurrence of Iacobucci 
and Bastarache JJ. He stressed the existing common law rules that ad-
vance costs only would be awarded in marital, corporate, and trusts 
case. He related these cases to “a presumption that the property that is 
the subject of the dispute is to be shared in some way” and that a party 
who receives an advance cost order “will win some award from the 
other party.”88 This principle was much more narrowly conceived than 
that of the majority and seems to merge with an even narrower rule 
based on the examples of when advance costs have previously been 
ordered under the common law. Justice Major also indicated that the 
trial judge was correct to be concerned about prejudging the case and 
“one may not presume that the Bands will establish even partial aborigi-
nal title in the cases under appeal.”89 Finally, he concluded that “the 
honour of the Crown is not at stake in this appeal” in part because “no 
right under section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 is implicated and 
the matter involves the provincial Crown rather than the federal 
Crown….”90 
Justice Major criticized the majority for sanctioning what has been 
described in the first part of this article as a strong discretion in trial 
judges to award advance costs. He warned that there was not “any ascer-
tainable standard or direction” for deciding when a public interest case 
was “special enough” to merit an award of advance costs. He argued 
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that appeals to the justice of the case were so vague that “[a] trial judge 
can draw no direction from this proposal.”91 In his view, concerns about 
access to justice should be left to legislative reform. 
2. The Judgment and the Three Models of Discretion 
Although it sets out three requirements for the order of advance 
costs, the majority judgment in Okanagan Indian Band seems to avoid a 
strict rule-based approach to the exercise of the discretion. The three 
criteria required by the majority all relate to the overall principle of 
access to justice that seems to lie at the root of the case. In other words, 
access to justice would not be advanced if interim costs were ordered 
when the litigation could occur without such orders, or if the claim was 
frivolous or only of importance to the parties themselves. The majority’s 
opinion could have been improved by more examination of the nature of 
the applicant’s claims. Even if section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 
or section 15 of the Charter do not require interim costs as a matter of 
right, they may provide important background support or “constitutional 
hints”92 that could help justify the award. The minority addresses the 
section 35 question, but is pre-emptory in concluding that the honour of 
the Crown is not engaged in this case and in error in asserting that there 
can be no fiduciary relationship between the provincial Crown and Abo-
riginal peoples.93 An important way of making the exercise of discretion 
more principled is for courts to pay attention to the purposes of the con-
stitution. For example, the Court indicated in Schachter v. Canada94 that 
the purposes of the Charter, particularly section 15, may support a read-
ing in remedy in some cases. The majority’s opinion in Okanagan In-
dian Band could have been improved by more attention to the 
underlying rights at stake as a means to give content its laudatory con-
cern with facilitating access to justice. 
One reason why LeBel J. may not have paid more attention to the 
merits of the applicant’s claim to Aboriginal title may have been a 
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concern about prejudging the merits, concerns that were stressed by 
both the trial judge and Major J. in his dissent. This can be related to the 
general concern about procedural fairness accepted as a relevant princi-
ple by both the majority and the minority in Doucet-Boudreau. Justice 
LeBel’s examination of the policy purposes of cost awards in general 
and the special nature of costs in public interest litigation, however, 
provides some answers to these concerns. As Justice LeBel points out, 
there is a growing recognition that costs are not mechanically or in-
variably tied to the cause, and that there may be many legitimate reasons 
why a losing public interest litigant should not have to pay costs to a 
successful governmental litigant (and in some cases may even be enti-
tled to costs). In addition, Justice LeBel’s direction that judges address 
the danger of private litigants being unfairly burdened with interim costs 
also suggests that it will often be equitable to place such burdens on 
governments who are in the best position to distribute the costs of access 
to justice. More explicit discussion of such considerations should allow 
a judge who awards interim costs in a public interest case to stress the 
importance of allowing the claim to be heard regardless of whether at 
the end of the day the claim is successful.  
The fear that advance costs will unfairly prejudge the case against 
the government can also be addressed by examining the principles that 
guide judges when exercising their discretion to grant public interest 
standing or hear moot cases.95 The emphasis in such cases is on the 
importance of a decision on the merits, and not on whether the court’s 
preliminary procedural decision prejudges the merits or prejudices the 
governmental defendants. Courts make sure that a constitutional claim is 
serious and has some merit before exercising their discretion, but this 
does not mean that the claim is valid. Indeed, the parties in a number of 
cases in which public interest standing has been granted have turned out 
to be losers on the merits. In public interest standing cases, like advance 
costs cases, courts ask themselves whether there is an alternative way 
that the issue raised in the case can be litigated. An important principle 
in both the public interest standing and mootness cases is that the ac-
tions of governments should not be immunized from review. A similar 
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principle informs the discretion to award advance costs. When deciding 
whether to exercise discretion to grant public interest standing, award 
advance costs, or decide a moot case, there is a common focus on the 
benefit of a decision on the merits to the public at large as opposed to 
the particular litigant. Although the minority criticizes the court for 
recognizing an open-ended discretion to award advance costs, there is 
no reason to think that a manageable and principled jurisprudence can-
not develop around advance costs, in much the same way as it has de-
veloped around the discretion to grant public interest standing or decide 
moot cases. 
A number of strategies are available to make the exercise of the dis-
cretion to award interim costs more principled. As suggested above, 
more attention could be paid to the importance of the rights claimed by 
the impecunious party. As with public interest standing and mootness, 
the emphasis should be on the importance of hearing and deciding such 
claims rather than on the question of whether the claims will in fact 
succeed at trial. Justice LeBel emphasized that the presence of the three 
criteria does not require a judge to award interim costs. Taken by itself 
such a residual discretion would lend support to the minority’s concern 
that the Court has recognized a strong and unguided discretion. At the 
same time, Justice LeBel helpfully provided some guidance about how 
the residual discretion should be exercised by raising concerns about 
imposing unfair burdens on private litigants. This concern reaffirms the 
value of allowing impecunious litigants to make serious claims against 
governments. Another helpful factor is for the majority to stress the 
importance of the trial judge giving full reasons to justify the decision 
whether or not to award interim costs.96 A requirement for full reasons 
can help ensure that principles will develop over time to guide the exer-
cise of discretion, and that the discretion does not degenerate into a 
strong form of discretion that can be exercised without reasons. 
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An emphasis on appellate deference to the exercise of discretion can 
produce a situation in which the discretion becomes a strong form of 
discretion that is resistant not only to appellate review but the applica-
tion of legal principles. For example, the majority of the British Columbia 
Court of Appeal in Auton (Guardian ad litem of) v. British Columbia 
(Attorney General)97 upheld the award of “symbolic damages” of 
$20,000 to parents who had established that their rights under section 15 
of the Charter had been denied by the government’s refusal to provide 
intensive behavioural therapy for their autistic children. Justice of Ap-
peal Saunders stressed the breadth of the trial judge’s remedial discre-
tion, even hinting that no damages might have been an appropriate 
remedy because the government may have had a good faith immunity. 
The result of this decision was that very little guidance was given to trial 
judges and litigants concerning the still underdeveloped nature of the 
Charter damage claim. It was not clear what, if any, degree of fault was 
necessary to justify damages and how damages, including damages for 
the violation of the constitutional right itself, should be calculated. In 
contrast, Lambert J.A. in his dissent took a more principled approach in 
that he attempted to outline the fault level required for damages under 
section 24(1) of the Charter and the appropriate method of calculating 
damages. To this end, he stressed that the Supreme Court’s 1997 
decision in Eldridge v. British Columbia98 should have alerted the 
government to the merit of the claim and that damages should be 
available for “the losses suffered by the adult petitioners in the period 
when those losses were attributable to the recalcitrance or inertia of the 
Crown in the face of the Eldridge case and the commencement of these 
proceedings.”99  
Reasonable people might disagree with Lambert J.A.’s dissent, but 
that is the point. His decision, unlike that of the majority, articulates 
principles that can be debated and which can guide the exercise of re-
medial discretion. For example, some might argue along with the 
petitioners, that damages should be available for even earlier losses in 
order to compensate all of the damages attributable to the section 15 
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damages.100 Others might argue that the government acted in good faith 
and should not have to pay any damages or pay only damages from the 
date of the trial judgment, making clear what section 15 of the Charter 
entailed in terms of health care for autistic children.101 These are diffi-
cult issues that ideally will be addressed when the Supreme Court deliv-
ers its judgment in this case. My point is only that reliance on the 
concept of appellate deference to the trial judge’s discretion may pro-
duce a situation in which courts fail to outline the principles that should 
guide decisions to award either interim costs or Charter damages. 
In his dissent in Okanagan Indian Band, Major J. rejected the idea 
that access to justice should be an animating principle for the exercise of 
the discretion to award interim costs. He argued that this would consti-
tute a radical departure from the treatment of advance costs under the 
common law and that it addresses questions best left for the legislature. 
Despite the fact that Major J. is the only constant, there are remarkable 
similarities between the approaches taken by the dissenters in Okanagan 
Indian Band and Doucet-Boudreau. Both dissents rely on the existing 
common law much more than the majority. The focus on common law 
concepts, such as the functus doctrine in Doucet-Boudreau and the 
common law jurisprudence on advance costs in Okanagan, leave the 
dissenters in both cases vulnerable to criticisms that they are discounting 
the importance of the public and constitutional law context. Both dis-
sents take the position that courts are ill-suited to making polycentric 
choices with distributional consequences. Both would counsel judicial 
deference to the ability of the legislature and the executive to make such 
decisions. Finally, both dissents gravitate towards a rule-based approach 
to the exercise of discretion. As discussed above, the dissent in Doucet-
Boudreau would hedge in trial judges in a manner that makes retention 
of jurisdiction or modification of remedies very difficult except in the 
rule-based context of a contempt hearing. Justice Major, in his dissent, 
relies heavily on the examples of cases where interim costs have been 
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previously awarded. The failure of the case at hand to fit into estab-
lished categories would preclude the award of advance costs. 
Justice Major’s concern that the majority has outlined a test that is 
based on strong or unguided discretion has some merit. Judges applying 
the decision can respond to these concerns by examining the importance 
of hearing public interest claims, regardless of their ultimate merit, and 
by exploring how the purposes of the particular right claimed may sup-
port the award of advance costs. In the Aboriginal rights context, there 
is a strong argument that the nature of the right claimed and the relation-
ship between governments and Aboriginal people may support the 
awarding of interim costs. Although the British Columbia Court of 
Appeal did not ground the advance cost order in section 35 or related 
fiduciary claims, it did consider these as important background factors 
that helped justify the order. Justice LeBel’s judgment, however, does 
not discuss these background factors at any great length. In my view this 
is unfortunate because attention to the purpose of the right claimed can 
assist judges in exercising their discretion to award advance costs on a 
more principled basis. There may be a concern that any exploration of 
the right at the advance costs stage will raise concerns about prejudg-
ment. This spectre can be dispelled by emphasizing the importance of 
public interest claims being heard, regardless of whether they are ulti-
mately rejected or accepted. Courts consider the seriousness and impor-
tance of the claim and the danger of immunizing governmental actions 
from review when exercising their discretion to award public interest 
standing or to hear moot cases without any serious objection that they 
have unfairly prejudged the case. 
In the end, Okanagan Indian Band is a more discordant and trou-
bling case than Doucet-Boudreau. In the latter case, all the judges 
agreed on the relevant principles while disagreeing on their application 
and weight. In the former, the minority rejected the access to justice 
principle that was central to the majority’s judgment recognizing a dis-
cretion to award advance costs in public interest litigation. At the same 
time, there are interesting parallels between Okanagan Indian Band and 
Doucet-Boudreau. The majority judgment in both cases can be defended 
as being grounded in general principles of justice that run the risk of 
degenerating into strong forms of discretion. The reasons given by trial 
judges in the future will be crucial in determining whether this danger 
can be avoided. In both cases, the exercise of discretion can be disci-
plined and improved by reflecting on the purposes of the Charter right at 
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stake, as well as the appropriate role of the court. The minority judg-
ments in both cases take a rule-based approach that stresses common 
law restrictions and discounts the significance of the public and consti-
tutional law context. The minority in Doucet-Boudreau discounts justice 
concerns related to the need for effective remedies while the minority in 
Okanagan Indian Band appears to reject concerns about access to jus-
tice altogether. Concerns about the limits of the judicial role loom large 
in both dissents.  
IV.  DELAYED OR SUSPENDED DECLARATIONS OF INVALIDITY 
1. The Judgments 
As discussed in the first part of this article, section 52(1) does not 
contemplate a discretion to suspend a declaration, but the Supreme 
Court has exercised this power in over 15 cases.102 The Court’s most 
extensive discussion of this discretion came in Schachter v. Canada103 
where it stressed that delayed declarations of invalidity were an extraor-
dinary remedy that allowed an unconstitutional state of affairs to persist 
and interfered with the legislature by forcing a matter onto the legisla-
tive agenda. Drawing on the limited number of cases in which a sus-
pended declaration of invalidity had been ordered to that date,104 Lamer 
C.J. formulated the following “guidelines”: 
Temporally suspending the declaration of invalidity to give Parliament 
or the provincial legislature in question an opportunity to bring the 
impugned legislation…into line with its constitutional obligations will 
be warranted even where striking down has been deemed the most 
appropriate option on the basis of one of the above criteria if: 
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A. striking down the legislation without enacting something in its 
place would pose a danger to the public; 
B. striking down the legislation without enacting something in its 
place would threaten the rule of law; or 
C. the legislation was deemed unconstitutional because of 
underinclusiveness rather than overbreadth, and therefore striking 
down the legislation would result in the deprivation of benefits 
from deserving persons without thereby benefitting the individual 
whose rights have been violated.105 
Although Lamer C.J. stated that these “guidelines” were not meant 
as “hard and fast rules”, they are an exemplar of the model of rule-based 
discretion outlined above. The Schachter guidelines are based on exam-
ples of instances when a suspended declaration of invalidity would be 
appropriate. These examples are determinative in and of themselves. 
Once a court finds that an immediate declaration of invalidity would 
endanger the public or the rule of law, it is not realistic to explore any 
question other than the length of the suspension. There is not much 
discussion of the underlying rationales or principles that might explain 
why a court should or should not suspend a declaration of invalidity. 
The examples speak for themselves without much elaboration. The 
categorical approach to when suspended declarations of invalidity are 
appropriate in Schachter seems to ignore two of the main remedial prin-
ciples that are articulated in that very decision to help guide the decision 
whether to strike an unconstitutional law or save it by a reading in rem-
edy. Those general principles are attention to the purposes of the Charter 
and the role of the legislature. With respect to the former, the Court says 
little about how a suspended declaration relates to the purposes of the 
Charter or the need to ensure that the successful Charter applicant re-
ceives an effective remedy. Chief Justice Lamer seemed to reject the 
relevance of the principle of proper institutional function when he stated 
that “the question whether to delay the application of a declaration of 
nullity should…turn not on considerations of the role of the courts and 
the legislature, but rather on considerations listed earlier relating to the 
effect of an immediate declaration on the public.”106  
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Since the Schachter guidelines were articulated in 1992, the Su-
preme Court has at times ignored them, often suspending declarations of 
invalidity without attempting to assimilate them into the three catego-
ries. This trend continued in 2003 as the Court suspended declarations 
of invalidity for 12 months in both Trociuk v. British Columbia (Attor-
ney General)107 and Figueroa v. Canada (Attorney General)108 and for 6 
months in Nova Scotia (Workers’ Compensation Board) v. Martin.109 
The Court adverted to the Schachter guidelines in Trociuk as it con-
cluded that an immediate declaration of invalidity would have the same 
effect as the nullification of underinclusive benefits because it would 
deprive mothers of the benefit of being able to make legitimate exclu-
sions of the father’s name on their children’s birth certificates. Similarly 
in Martin, the Court reasoned that a suspended declaration of invalidity 
“would preserve the limited benefits of the current program until an 
appropriate legislative response to chronic pain can be implemented.”110 
In Figueroa,111 no attempt was made to apply the Schachter guidelines. 
The Court simply noted that it would suspend the declaration of invalid-
ity for “12 months in order to enable the government to comply with 
these reasons.” 
In R. v. Powley,112 the Court refused to extend a suspended declara-
tion of invalidity ordered by the Ontario Court of Appeal, but again the 
decision did not focus exclusively on the Schachter criteria. The Court 
noted that the Court of Appeal had jurisdiction and discretion to suspend 
its declaration, but stated that “[t]his power should continue to be used 
only in exceptional situations in which a court of general jurisdiction 
deems that giving immediate effect to an order will undermine the very 
purpose of that order or otherwise threaten the rule of law.” The idea 
that a suspended declaration is exceptional and preserves the rule of law 
and prevents chaos relates to the Schachter guidelines, but the idea that 
a suspended declaration can be used when an immediate declaration 
would “undermine the very purpose of that order” is a new and some-
what circular addition to the Schachter guidelines. The Court added that 
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it was “within the Court of Appeal’s discretion to suspend the applica-
tion of its ruling to other members of the Métis community in order to 
foster cooperative solutions and ensure that the resource in question was 
not depleted in the interim, thereby negating the value of the right.” 
Concerns about promoting co-operative solutions may very well be 
compelling in the Aboriginal rights context,113 but they are not captured 
in the three-point Schachter guidelines.  
The most notable and controversial application of the Schachter cri-
teria in 2003 was the decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal reading in 
the ability of same-sex couples to marry. The Court of Appeal rejected 
the federal government’s request for a suspended declaration on the 
basis that “there is no evidence before this court that a declaration of 
invalidity without a period of suspension will pose any harm to the 
public, threaten the rule of law, or deny anyone the benefit of legal rec-
ognition of their marriage.”114 This was a classic rule-based approach to 
the exercise of discretion. The facts of the case at hand did not fit into 
the three categories or pigeonholes in Schachter, and this was taken by 
the Court of Appeal to be determinative without the need for any further 
analysis or interpretation. The refusal to suspend the declaration of inva-
lidity in Halpern has been intensely controversial. On the one hand, it 
can be defended as based on the traditional principle of rights requiring 
effective, prompt, and meaningful remedies even though this principle 
does not feature prominently in the Schachter guidelines. On the other 
hand, it can be opposed on the basis that by creating immediate same-
sex marriages, it fettered the role of Parliament in responding to the 
decision even though consideration of the appropriate role of legisla-
tures and the courts is rejected by the Schachter guidelines. My point 
here is not to attempt to resolve the controversy over whether a sus-
pended declaration of invalidity should have been issued in Halpern, but 
only to note how the mechanical application of the Schachter guidelines 
avoided discussion of the contested principles of effective remedies and 
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proper institutional role that should have been central to whether the 
Court of Appeal’s declaration ought to have had immediate effect or 
been subject to a period of suspension. 
2. The Judgments and the Three Models of Discretion 
The judicial approach to suspended declarations of invalidity dem-
onstrates some of the affinities between strong forms of discretion and 
rule-based discretion. As discussed above, the Supreme Court in 
Schachter created a three-category rule for the use of suspended declara-
tions of invalidity that was based on examples taken from the existing 
case law. Judges who follow the Schachter guidelines must determine 
whether the case at hand fits into these three categories. Sometimes, as 
in Trociuk, this process of applying the rules will require interpretation 
of the rule and reasoning by analogy. Trociuk was not a case about 
underinclusive benefits, but Deschamps J. for the Court determined that 
it was analogous to such a case because an immediate declaration of 
invalidity would deprive mothers of a legitimate and constitutional 
operation of the impugned statute, even though the law also constituted 
unjustified discrimination against men. This was a significant expansion 
of the Schachter guidelines,115 but one that was based on the 
interpretation of the underlying rule created in Schachter. It did not 
require a sustained analysis of why a declaration of invalidity should be 
suspended or what effects this would have on either the successful 
Charter applicant or the government, but it did make the third Schachter 
category more flexible and expansive. 
Figueroa stands at the other extreme as the Court simply ordered a 
12-month suspension of the declaration of invalidity without any at-
tempt to apply the Schachter criteria. The paucity of reasoning on this 
issue suggests that the Court was acting as if the decision to suspend the 
declaration was a matter of strong discretion. The Court in Figueroa 
could perhaps have made an effort, as it did in Trociuk, to fit the case 
into the Schachter categories of a threat to a rule of law or public danger 
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or an underinclusive benefit. It likely did not make such an attempt 
because the case represented an even bigger stretch of the categories 
than Trociuk. An immediate declaration of invalidity in this case would 
likely have caused some confusion for election officials, but it would 
hardly have threatened the rule of law or public safety, and it would not 
have deprived anyone of a legitimate and constitutional benefit. Never-
theless, the Court concluded that a suspension was appropriate in order 
to give Parliament time to replace the existing regime with a constitu-
tional one and to select from among a range of constitutional options.  
The use of a suspended declaration of invalidity in Figueroa ac-
cords with what Sujit Choudhry and I have observed elsewhere has been 
the largely silent evolution of the suspended declaration of invalidity 
“beyond its origins as an emergency measure” into “a powerful dialogic 
device that allows a court to remand complex issues to legislative insti-
tutions.”116 At the same time, it is striking that the Court has said so little 
about this evolution. This silence may also explain why the Court has 
yet to confront the problems created by increased use of suspended 
declaration of invalidity, including the potential of leaving applicants 
without tangible remedies in part because of the delay sanctioned by the 
Court117 and in part because of the norm of legislatures amending their 
laws in a prospective fashion that does not address the harms of the 
past.118 My point is not that the courts should return to a mechanical 
application of the Schachter categories, but rather that they should more 
openly recognize the complex and conflicting principles at stake. 
There may be a reason why remedial discretion in this context has 
bounced between the extremes of rule-based and strong discretion. 
Rule-based discretion by its nature of relying on self-executing catego-
ries often makes discussion of the underlying rationale for the rule un-
necessary. In Schachter, the Court went out of its way of avoiding 
principles when it stated that the decision to suspend a declaration 
“should…turn not on considerations of the role of the courts and the 
legislature, but rather on considerations listed earlier relating to the 
effect of an immediate declaration on the public.”119 Thus, the principle 
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of proper institutional rule, as articulated and discussed by all the judges 
in Doucet-Boudreau, was put off bounds for discussion. Likewise, there 
was no explicit discussion of the principle of effective and meaningful 
remedies, again a principle that is discussed by all judges in Doucet-
Boudreau. There is something about the certainty sought by rule- and 
category-based discretion that is hostile to the discussion of underlying 
principles that are themselves open-ended and subject to differing inter-
pretations. It is almost as if judges applying rules or exercising strong 
discretion do not say too much, lest one of their colleagues disagree 
with them. In this sense, the suspended declaration of invalidity cases 
are generally unanimous decisions, whereas the more principled ap-
proach taken in cases like Doucet-Boudreau and Okanagan Indian Band 
produces a divided Court that does not agree on the weight or even the 
relevance of the competing principles.  
The absence of attention to principle in rule-based discretion may 
promote a flight to strong discretion. Judges who find that the rules and 
categories, even when extended by analogical reasoning, are not appro-
priate may be tempted to make the leap, seen in Figueroa, towards 
strong forms of discretion. To be sure, the leap is a large one, but when 
judges make it they find themselves on familiar ground. In other words, 
both strong and rule-based forms of discretion are characterized by their 
neglect of underlying principles and by their ability to produce decisions 
that, at first glance, do not seem to invite controversy and debate. An-
other similarity is that both rule-based and strong discretion may be 
inherently unstable and unpredictable. Judges will fight the limited 
categories of the rules in order to achieve justice in a particular case, but 
the result will often be the unpredictability of strong forms of discretion 
that appear to be based on the will of the judges. Both forms of discre-
tion are unsatisfying because they allow judges to make decisions that 
appear to be blind to important considerations about whether an effec-
tive remedy has been ordered and whether institutional roles have been 
respected. 
The Supreme Court needs to revisit the test for suspending declara-
tions of invalidity. The status quo of bouncing from the rule-based ap-
proach seen in Trociuk and Martin to the strong discretion of Figueroa 
in the space of less than a year is not acceptable. The controversy over 
the refusal to suspend the declaration of invalidity in Halpern also dem-
onstrates the need to grapple with the underlying principles. Many peo-
ple expected the Court of Appeal to suspend the declaration of invalidity 
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to give the legislature an opportunity to act and were taken by surprise 
when the Court of Appeal refused to do so. At the same time, the Court 
of Appeal cannot be criticized too harshly because it was following a 
rule established, but often not followed, by the Supreme Court. The 
prediction that the Court of Appeal would delay any declaration of inva-
lidity in the gay marriage case avoided dealing with the Schachter cate-
gories and the statement in Schachter that concerns about appropriate 
institutional role should not enter into a decision whether to suspend a 
declaration of invalidity. Such avoidance was, of course, encouraged by 
the Supreme Court’s own avoidance of this troublesome precedent. 
An important step toward a more principled approach to suspended 
declarations of invalidity will be to re-evaluate both the three examples 
in Schachter and the statement that concerns about the appropriate role 
of courts and legislatures should not enter into the decision whether to 
suspend a declaration of invalidity. A minimalist reform is for the Court 
to follow the path of Trociuk and extend the three categories by analogy. 
Reasoning by analogy from the Schachter categories may reveal some 
more general principles which may support the specific rule. For exam-
ple, the underinclusive legislation example in Schachter as fleshed out 
by Trociuk now seems to embrace a broader concern about the harmful 
effects of an immediate declaration of invalidity in preventing legiti-
mate, needed, and constitutional uses of a law that is unconstitutional in 
only some of its applications. Analogies can also be made to how courts 
save constitutional aspects of a law by severance or by reading down or 
reading in. This process of reasoning could improve the Schachter fac-
tors and make them more flexible, but judges will still be chained by the 
three Schachter categories. Moreover, a focus on these three categories 
will likely fail to produce a full outline of the relevant principles that 
should inform remedial decision-making. For example, the principles of 
effective remedies and proper institutional role that were so central to 
Doucet-Boudreau are not present in the Schachter categories of appro-
priate cases to use a suspended declaration of invalidity. These general 
principles are not present in the Schachter categories even though they 
played a central role when the Court in Schachter articulated helpful and 
workable principles to guide judges when deciding whether unconstitu-
tionally underinclusive legislation should be extended by a reading in 
remedy, or struck down. 
Bruce Ryder has suggested a more maximalist reform of the 
Schachter guidelines for suspended declarations of invalidity. Professor 
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Ryder argues that the decision whether to suspend a declaration of 
invalidity should be expanded into a general balancing of interests test. 
The government should have a section 1-type burden to demonstrate 
that an immediate declaration of invalidity would “have a negative 
impact on the exercise of Charter rights or freedoms, or a negative 
impact on some other compelling social interests.”120 This proposal has 
the virtue of making clear that the government has to justify a sus-
pended declaration of invalidity and of opening up the reasons for a 
suspended declaration of invalidity to a more open-ended list of “com-
pelling social interests” that are important enough under section 1 of the 
Charter to justify a limit on Charter rights. There is also precedent in 
Schachter for looking to the developed jurisprudence under section 1 of 
the Charter to guide remedial decision-making. Nevertheless, the incor-
poration of section 1 reasoning in Schachter to help guide the decision 
whether to strike an unconstitutional law down or save it by reading in 
has not been entirely satisfactory. It only eliminates reading in as a rem-
edy in cases where the objective is unconstitutional or the law is not 
rationally connected to the objective. This approach runs the risk of 
either doing too little in the many cases decided on issues of least drastic 
means or perhaps doing too much when, as in Halpern, the court ap-
pears to be sceptical about whether the objectives of the unconstitutional 
law are important enough to limit a Charter right. Justice La Forest, in 
his concurrence in Schachter, complained that the incorporation of sec-
tion 1 reasoning could “encourage a mechanistic approach to the proc-
ess, rather than encourage examination of more fundamental issues.”121 
In my view, the fundamental principles at stake in remedial deci-
sion-making are not so much section 1 considerations, but the issues of 
effective remedies, proper institutional role, and fairness that are dis-
cussed by all nine judges in Doucet-Boudreau. Under such an approach, 
decisions about suspended declarations of invalidity might look more 
like the majority judgment in Doucet-Boudreau where there is acknowl-
edgement of remedial discretion, but discussion of a number of compet-
ing principles which animate the exercise of that discretion. Such an 
approach will not result in agreement in all cases, as witnessed by the 
division of the Court in Doucet-Boudreau about the relevant weight that 
                                                                                                                                
120  Ryder, “Suspending the Charter,” supra, note 102, at 284-85. 
121  Schachter v. Canada, supra, note 5, at 729, para. 110. 
(2004), 25 S.C.L.R. (2d) Principled Remedial Discretion 143 
 
should be given to the multiple principles in the particular context. Nev-
ertheless, it would invite judges to give fuller reasons to justify their 
judicial choices and allow for the refinement of the relevant principles 
in a manner that has so far not occurred as courts have at various times 
been attracted to an application of the Schachter categories or a strong 
discretion to suspend declarations without resort to either those catego-
ries or full reasons. 
What factors would guide judges under a more principled approach 
to the use of suspended declarations of invalidity? An important factor, 
and one that has been neglected in the present jurisprudence of sus-
pended declarations, is the need to provide effective and meaningful 
remedies to successful Charter applicants. Judges would be encouraged 
to consider the anomalous position that successful Charter applicants 
find themselves in when they win a Charter victory only to be told that 
the unconstitutional law will remain valid for another 6 to 24 months. 
The courts should consider whether the successful Charter applicant 
should be exempted from the period of delay in light of the principle 
that successful Charter applicants should receive meaningful reme-
dies.122 An additional or alternative remedy in some cases might be a 
higher cost award to the successful Charter applicant. Courts should also 
consider the position of those who are in an identical position to the 
successful applicants, but who may not be exempted from the suspended 
declaration of invalidity. They can encourage the legislature to devise 
meaningful remedies by assuming that remedial legislation departs from 
the usual norm of legislation only having prospective effect. Such an 
approach may respond to potential inequities caused by exempting the 
successful Charter applicant but not others similarly situated.123 Courts 
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should also address whether they will retain jurisdiction during the pe-
riod of the suspension in order to minimize the damage to the Charter 
during the period of the suspension.124  
An important issue for the Supreme Court to decide is whether 
considerations of institutional role should enter into the decision 
whether to suspend declarations of invalidity. Following the principled 
approach in Doucet-Boudreau, courts should in my view consider the 
need “to respect the relationships with and separation of functions 
among the legislature, the executive and the judiciary”125 and the limits 
of the judicial function when deciding whether to suspend a declaration 
of invalidity. This would require rejection or perhaps qualification of 
Lamer C.J.’s dicta in Schachter126 that such considerations are not 
relevant in deciding whether to suspend a declaration of invalidity. In 
some cases, it would be appropriate for courts to acknowledge that the 
legislature can employ a greater and more creative range of remedies 
than the court can. The legislature can amend more laws than are before 
the court. It can also devise creative new solutions to constitutional 
problems that would exceed even the most robust understanding of the 
judicial function. For example, a delayed declaration of invalidity in a 
case such as M. v. H.127 allowed the legislature an opportunity to engage 
in comprehensive reform that could not be achieved even by a robust 
reading in remedy with respect to the impugned statute. In its response 
to M. v. H., the Ontario legislature also created the controversial 
category of “same-sex partner” as an alternative to the recognition of 
same-sex spouses, even though it extended benefits equally to both 
categories. Delayed declarations of invalidity in the case of unconstitu-
tional electoral boundaries gave the legislature the option of expanding 
the number of seats in the legislature in order to have manageable rid-
ings in the north and other remote areas whereas even the most intrusive 
judicial remedy would only require the boundaries to be redrawn within 
the existing number of seats.128 Delayed declarations of invalidity can 
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number of seats.128 Delayed declarations of invalidity can allow legisla-
tures to enact remedies that the court alone could not enact.  
As recognized by L’Heureux-Dubé J. in Corbiere v. Canada,129 
suspended declarations of invalidity can allow governments to consult 
with those affected by the remedies and “[c]onstitutional remedies 
should encourage the government to take into account the interests, and 
views, of minorities.” The government can take the time provided by the 
delayed declaration to engage in consultation with the minorities in-
tended to benefit from the remedy to determine how their priorities, 
needs, and aspirations should affect the remedy.130 The government can 
also consult with others who are affected by the remedy and who may 
play a role in determining whether it will be effective, in order to deter-
mine that the remedy does not “impose substantial hardships that are 
unrelated to securing the right.”131 
A principled approach to suspended declarations can also recognize 
what has frequently been described as a partnership or a dialogue be-
tween the courts and legislatures, in which the two institutions play 
distinct and complementary roles. A recognition of a remedial dialogue 
or partnership would also accord with McLachlin C.J.’s recognition in 
her extra-judicial writings that delayed declarations of invalidity are a 
Canadian innovation that can facilitate judicial and legislative co-
operation.132 At the same time, it can be argued that dialogue can occur 
with or without delayed declarations of invalidity. Parliament responded 
to Schachter by reducing the period of parental leave not when the Su-
preme Court issued a delayed declaration of invalidity, but rather when 
lower courts read in biological parents into parental leave benefits de-
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signed for adoptive parents. The federal government and many prov-
inces responded to M. v. H. with new legislation even though it was only 
Ontario that was subject to the delayed declaration of invalidity. It must 
be acknowledged that the legislature can exercise its legislative function 
with or without a suspended declaration of invalidity.133  
Nevertheless, a delay can serve the important purpose of prompting 
the government to address the issue. It fits into a pattern of dialogic 
democracy in which the courts place issues concerning the treatment of 
rights onto the legislative agenda when the legislature might otherwise 
wish to avoid the issue or leave the status quo in place. The dissenters in 
Doucet-Boudreau would likely object to a democracy forcing justifica-
tion for suspended declarations of invalidity. They might well argue that 
such a remedy would be designed to “put … pressure on the government 
to act. This kind of pressure is paradigmatically associated with political 
actors.”134 In my view, this is too absolutist a view of the separation of 
powers. An inflexible rule against considering institutional role when 
suspending a declaration of invalidity does not fit the many cases in 
which the courts have used delayed declarations as a way of remanding 
complex issues back to the legislature.135  
An immediate declaration of invalidity, or indeed creative reading in 
remedies,136 may sap democracy by creating the impression that courts 
are capable of solving all of society’s constitutional problems without 
requiring legislators to rethink their decisions in light of the court’s 
rulings. An immediate declaration of invalidity may also create entitle-
ments that will unduly constrain the range of legislative choices.137 
Although he is generally sceptical about dialogic uses of delayed decla-
rations of invalidity, Professor Ryder recognizes that an immediate 
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declaration of invalidity could “narrow the range of practical options to 
the democratically accountable branch of government” and that a sus-
pended declaration could be justified in some cases on the basis that it 
“would respect the primacy of the legislature’s law-making role.”138 A 
judge may, subject to other factors such as the need to ensure an effec-
tive and meaningful remedy, be justified in suspending a declaration of 
invalidity in order to allow the legislature an opportunity to exercise the 
full range of constitutional processes and options in responding to the 
court’s finding that the existing law is unconstitutional. 
It is not clear whether the Court will accept the relevance of institu-
tional or dialogic factors in determining whether a suspended declara-
tion of invalidity is appropriate. As discussed above, Lamer C.J. rejected 
the relevance of such considerations in Schachter. More recently, the 
majority judgment in Doucet-Boudreau demonstrated some discomfort 
with the metaphor of dialogue. Justices Iacobucci and Arbour stated that 
“judicial restraint and metaphors such as ‘dialogue’ must not be elevated 
to the level of strict constitutional rules to which the words of section 24 
can be subordinated.”139 It is difficult to know whether this is something 
of an aside or a rethinking of previous uses of the dialogue metaphor by 
the Court. The Court’s invocation of the dialogue metaphor has not been 
consistent with some judges using dialogue as a principle for deference 
to legislative replies and others using it as a justification for striking 
down a law.140 More fundamentally, the Court has used dialogue in 
different ways, sometimes suggesting that it represents the idea that 
courts can add something to social and political debates that would not 
otherwise be present or fully heard, and on other occasions suggesting 
dialogue can result in the courts’ and legislatures’ holding each other 
accountable, or that dialogue encourages the legislature to act on an 
interpretation of the Charter that differs from that of the Court.141  
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In my view, the dialogue metaphor is most useful to describe the 
constitutional theory implicit in the Charter and other modern bills of 
rights that allow ordinary legislation enacted by democratically elected 
legislatures to limit or derogate from rights as interpreted and enforced 
by the independent judiciary. The concept of dialogue and the related 
concept of respect for institutional role should play a role in the reme-
dial decisions of the court. Canadian courts have often relied on general 
declarations to allow both the executive and the legislature flexibility to 
play their role in selecting the precise means to honour constitutional 
obligations.142 Delayed declarations of invalidity can allow the legisla-
ture an opportunity to select from among the widest range of constitu-
tional options, including the full range of legislative options under 
sections 1 and 33 of the Charter. Although some assert that legislation 
cannot be a remedy, Canada in fact has a long history of remedial legis-
lation.143 Given its central role in Doucet-Boudreau and indeed in that 
part of Schachter that relates to the choice between reading in and strik-
ing down as a remedy, the idea that respect for the respective roles of 
courts and legislatures should never enter into the decision whether to 
suspend a declaration of invalidity is not sustainable. That does not 
mean, however, that this principle will be interpreted in the same way 
by all judges or that it is the exclusive or necessarily the weightiest 
principle in remedial decision-making. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Remedial discretion is an important feature of the Charter. It is 
needed to ensure effective enforcement of the Charter, but it must also 
be conceptualized in a manner that makes it part of the Charter. One 
approach is to conceptualize it as a strong discretion that gives trial 
judges much freedom and restrains appellate courts from interfering. 
This approach is not consistent with the idea that people have rights to 
remedies, and the emphasis on rational explanation and principled rea-
soning when interpreting Charter rights and when deciding whether 
limits on Charter rights have been justified. Dissenting judges in both 
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Doucet-Boudreau and Okanagan Indian Band expressed concerns that 
the Court was sanctioning strong discretion or an unpredictable “judicial 
carte blanche”144 in devising remedies under section 24(1) and awarding 
interim or advance costs in public interest litigation. The greatest danger 
of strong remedial discretion is seen in a case such as Figueroa, in 
which the Court exercises a discretion to suspend a declaration of inva-
lidity without giving real reasons for why it is doing so. The flip side of 
strong discretion is seen in cases such as Schachter in which the Court 
articulates three categories that purport to outline all the circumstances 
in which a suspended declaration of invalidity is appropriate. All that 
judges need do then is decide whether the case at hand fits the catego-
ries. A more sophisticated approach to rule-based discretion was taken 
in Trociuk when the Court interpreted the Schachter categories and 
extended them by analogy. If strong discretion is under-governed by 
law, rule-based discretion is over-governed in the sense that judges have 
little freedom to devise and justify new remedies in response to new 
rights and new circumstances. The main weakness of both strong and 
rule-based discretion is that they allow judges to make momentous re-
medial decisions with inadequate attention to principles and with inade-
quate reasons. 
A principled approach to remedial decision-making attempts to 
make the exercise of remedial discretion more consistent with the ap-
proach taken to the interpretation of the rest of the Charter. The key to 
principled remedial decision-making is not that a right answer will 
magically appear, but that the judges and parties can reach some tenta-
tive agreement on the relevant principles and then debate the scope and 
relative weight of each principle in the particular context. This is what 
occurred in Doucet-Boudreau even though the Court split 5:4 over what 
principle was most important. The majority stressed the need for effec-
tive and meaningful remedies in the context of a chronic violation of 
section 23 of the Charter and the minority stressed the competing prin-
ciple of appropriate institutional role. At the same time, the majority in 
Doucet-Boudreau did not ignore the principles of proper institutional 
role and fairness to the governmental defendants, and the minority at-
tempted to argue that its approach was consistent with remedial effec-
tiveness. Doucet-Boudreau is a positive sign in the development of 
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remedies under the Charter because all the judges agreed on the relevant 
principles, even though at the end of the day they did not agree on what 
those principles required and which were most important in the particu-
lar case. Nevertheless, the decision has provided a principled framework 
for the future.  
Okanagan Indian Band is a more troubling case because the judges 
did not agree about what principles should inform a trial judge’s discre-
tion to order interim or advance costs. The majority stressed the princi-
ple of access to justice while the minority restricted advance costs to 
cases decided under the prior common law. The majority itself could 
have made its decision more principled by stressing the importance to 
the public interest of hearing claims of Aboriginal rights while not pre-
judging the particular case. The suspended declaration of invalidity 
cases are the most troubling as they avoid examination of principles 
such as the need for effective remedies and the need to respect institu-
tional role, and haphazardly bounce back and forth from a categorical 
rule-based approach to a strong discretion approach. Principled remedial 
decision-making is no recipe for agreement, but it should, as it did in 
Doucet-Boudreau, produce a more wide-ranging and substantive debate 
about the best way to exercise remedial discretion.  
 
 
